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1. INTRODUCTION
Britain’s  anti-discrimination  legislation  outlaws   the   victimising   of   persons   who   use   that
legislation. The legislation, by way of a number of statutes, covers discrimination regarding  Race,
Sex,    Disability    and    (for    Northern    Ireland)    Political    Opinion    or    Religious    Belief.
Victimisation provides a separate course of action for anyone  treated  less  favourably  ‘by  reason
that’ they brought a discrimination claim, or did something else by reference to the legislation.
            In Chief Constable of  West  Yorkshire  Police  v  Khan  the  House  of  Lords  rejected  the
‘causative’ - or but for - approach to the phrase ‘by reason that’, which the House established in  R
v Birmingham City Council, ex parte EOC [1989] 1 AC 1156, and James v Eastleigh BC [1990]  2
AC 751 (for direct discrimination) and Nagarajan v LRT [1999] 4 All ER 65, [2001] AC 502  (for
victimisation).  The  House  also  restated  the  view  that  the  comparator   for   establishing   less
favourable treatment should be a person who has not done the act in any sense at all  and  clarified
what was meant by ‘less favourable’.
2. THE LEGISLATION
Victimisation is defined in section 2, Race Relations Act 1976 as:
‘(1) a person (“the discriminator”) discriminates against another person (“the  person  victimised”)
in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of this any  provision  of  this  Act  if  he  treats  the
person victimised  less  favourably  than  in  those  circumstances  he  treats  or  would  treat  other
persons, and does so by reason that the person victimised has--
(a) brought proceedings under the Act against any person; or
(b)        given information or evidence in connection with such proceedings; or
(c)        otherwise done anything under or by reference to the Act in relation to any person; or
(d) alleged that any person has committed an act which (whether or  not  the  allegation  so  states)
would amount to a contravention of the Act, or by reason  that  the  discriminator  knows  that  the
person victimised intends to do any of those  things,  or  suspects  that  the  person  victimised  has
done, or intends to do, any of them.
Section 4(1), Sex Discrimination Act 1975, section 55(2), Disability Discrimination Act 1995  and
article  5(3),  Fair  Employment  and  Treatment  Order  1998  each  provides  a  definition  that  is
materially the same. The acts described in paragraphs (a) to (d) are generally known as  ‘protected
acts.’
3. FACTS AND DECISION
In September 1996 Sergeant Khan applied to become an Inspector within his force.  However,  his
Chief Constable failed to support the application. That failure led Khan to issue proceedings under
the Race Relations Act. Then in October, Khan applied to be an Inspector with the Norfolk Police.
Acting  on  legal  advice,  the  Chief  Constable  refused  to  provide  the  Norfolk  Police   with   a
reference. Instead, he stated:
"Sergeant Khan has an outstanding industrial tribunal application against the  chief  constable  for
failing to support his application for promotion. In the light of that, the chief constable is unable to
comment any further for fear of prejudicing his own case before the tribunal."
Following that, Khan brought separate proceedings  claiming  that  he  had  been  victimised.  The
Chief Constable argued that the reason for withholding a reference  was  to  avoid  prejudicing  his
own case in the discrimination proceedings brought by Khan. The House  of  Lords,  reversing  all
the decisions below, allowed the Chief Constable’s appeal. In doing so they addressed three issues
regarding the definition of  victimisation.  Lords  Nicholls,  Mackay  of  Clashfern,  Hoffman  and
Scott each made separate speeches. Lord Hutton agreed with  Lords  Nicholls  and  Hoffman.  The
House considered three elements of the definition of victimisation: (i) with whom is  the  claimant
compared to establish less favourable treatment; (ii) what amounts to is less  favourable;  and  (iii)
the meaning of ‘by reason that’.
A. Treated Less Favourably Than Whom?
The Chief Constable argued the treatment given to Sergeant Khan  should  be  compared  with  the
treatment that would have been given to an employee who had brought other proceedings, such  as
libel, or constructive dismissal. This argument  was  first  raised  in  Kirby  v  Manpower  Services
Commission [1980] ICR 420, where an employee at a job centre was moved to less desirable work
because  he  disclosed  confidential  information  regarding   suspected   discrimination   by   some
employers.  The  EAT  compared  Kirby’s  treatment  to  that  of  a   worker   who   had   disclosed
confidential information, but unrelated to discrimination. As this hypothetical worker would  have
been similarly moved to less desirable work, the EAT concluded that Kirby had  not  been  treated
less favourably. However, the Court of Appeal, in Aziz v Trinity Street Taxis [1988] 2 All ER  860
rejected  this  approach  and  held  that  the  comparison  should  not  include  any  element  of  the
protected act. Otherwise, as Slade, LJ reasoned (at 869), if a defendant could show that  he  would
have treated a ‘Kirby comparator’ in the same way as the claimant, the  ‘absurd  result’  would  be
that the claimant would ‘necessarily fail’.
            The House of Lords  followed  Aziz.  Lords  Nicholls,  Scott  and  Hoffman  discussed  this
issue. For Lord Nicholls it boiled down to a choice between Kirby and Aziz. He concluded (at para
27): ‘There are arguments in favour of both approaches. On the whole I  see  no  sufficient  reason
for departing from the...approach adopted by Slade,  LJ  in  the  Aziz  case.  Lord  Scott  was  more
trenchant. He rejected the Kirby approach, stating (at para 72) ‘That  cannot  be  right....  It  would
enable employers to victimise employees  who  brought  race  discrimination  proceedings  against
them provided they, the employers, were prepared similarly to victimise  any  employee  who  had
the temerity to sue them for anything.’ Lord Hoffman rejected Kirby with equal certainty  (at  para
48).
            The point is that the approach in Kirby ensures that virtually no claim could succeed.  This
is because a ‘Kirby comparator’ has done the protected act except for the RRA element. Thus  any
employer could testify ‘I treat all complainants the same, whether or not the  complaint  is  one  of
discrimination.’  Further, if one removes only the RRA element from the protected act,  a  tribunal
is then  effectively  trying  to  identify  less  favourable  treatment  on  grounds  of  race,  which  is
covered by section 1, not section 2, thus rendering section 2 meaningless.
            It is surprising that this argument - that was apparently settled in Aziz back in 1988 - is still
being raised by employers. They may have been encouraged by the Court of  Appeal’s  reluctance
to overrule its own decision on this element in Cornelius v University College of  Swansea  [1987]
IRLR 141 where it held (at para 33) that an employer’s refusal to grant a transfer request or  allow
the grievance procedure, after the claimant had issued (sex) discrimination  proceedings,  was  not
less favourable treatment. (See further [2000] 29 ILJ 304.) Since then, in a number cases,  counsel
for the defendant has cited Cornelius in support of using a ‘Kirby comparator,’ only for the  Court
of Appeal to reject Kirby but ‘distinguish’ Cornelius. This occurred in Aziz (at 872), Khan  [2000]
ICR 1169, (at para 28) and Brown v TNT Express Worldwide [2001] ICR 182 (at para 33).
Employers may have also been encouraged by some sentiments expressed by the judiciary.
For  instance,  Lord  Nicholls’  comment  (above)  that  ‘There  are  arguments  in  favour  of  both
approaches’ is not the language to  reject  a  case  absolutely.  In  the  same  case  in  the  Court  of
Appeal, Lord Woolf, MR stated (at para 24): ‘I would like to look favourably on [the]  submission
that you should ask whether the respondent  was  treated  any  differently  from  anyone  else  who
brought proceedings’. But he ‘felt driven’ by precedent and his interpretation of section 2 to reject
the ‘Kirby comparator’. In Khan, only Lords Scott and Hoffman  echoed the certainty of Slade, LJ
in Aziz. All the same, it must be assumed that  now  the  House  of  Lords  has  rejected  Kirby,  no
matter how reluctantly, it is bad law.
B. Was The Refusal of a Reference ‘Less Favourable’?
Despite not receiving a  reference  the  Norfolk  Police  invited  Sergeant  Khan  for  an  interview,
which he failed. It was common ground that had a reference been given, containing the  Yorkshire
Police’s low assessment of Sergeant Khan’s managerial  skills,  he  may  not  had  even  made  the
interview  stage.  In  other  words,  the  Chief  Constable  argued,  Khan  was   treated   more,   not
less favourably. The House  of  Lords  rejected  that  argument.  Only  Lords  Hoffman  and  Scott
discussed the matter. Lord Scott concluded (at para 76):
‘It cannot... be enough for s 2(1) purposes simply to show that the  complainant  has  been  treated
differently.....I think it suffices if the complainant can reasonably say that he would have preferred
not to have been treated differently.’
This approach has echoes  of  the  discrimination  case  (under  s  1  SDA)  R  v  Birmingham  City
Council, ex parte EOC [1989] 1 AC 1156 where a local authority operated a  policy  of  favouring
boys in the  admission  to  grammar  schools.  They  argued  that  as  there  was  no  evidence  that
grammar schools were better than the other schools, girls  had  not  been  less  favourably  treated.
The House of Lords held that as the girls were denied a choice which  they  -  and  their  parents  -
valued, on reasonable grounds, they had  been  treated  less  favourably.  It  would  seem  that  the
courts  should  not  be   too   pedantic   about   this   element.   There   must   be   more   than   just
different treatment, but it is enough if the complainant perceives - reasonably  -  that  he  has  been
treated less favourably.
C. ‘By Reason That’
This is the controversial aspect of the case. The House of Lords reversed  all  the  decisions  below
on this issue. A unanimous Court of Appeal thought they  had  applied  the  law  as  stated  by  the
House of Lords in the recent case Nagarajan v LRT  [1999]  4  All  ER  65,  (discussed  [2000]  29
ILJ 304). In Nagarajan a four-to-one majority  held  that  the  phrase  ‘by  reason  that’  should  be
given  a  straightforward  causative  interpretation,  free  from  any  conscious  motivation  on   the
defendant’s part. They relied on the interpretation given to section 1, SDA or RRA, which  defines
direct discrimination, in R v Birmingham City  Council,  ex  parte  EOC  [1989]  1  AC  1156  and
James v Eastleigh Council [1990] 2 AC 751.  Section  1,  SDA,  defines  direct  discrimination  as
being treated less favourably on the grounds of sex. The House of Lords held  in  those  cases  that
the ’causative’ question raised by the phrase ’on the grounds of’ should be  resolved  by  a  simple
‘but for’ test: would the complainant have received  the  same  treatment  from  the  defendant  but
for his or her sex? In Nagarajan the majority held that the phrase ’by reason that’  was  parallel  to
the phrase ’on grounds of her sex’ (or ’on racial grounds’) used  in  section  1.  In  particular  Lord
Steyn held (at 79) that this approach was also correct for section  2  because  victimisation  was  as
serious a mischief as direct discrimination and ‘common sense’ suggested  that  a  tribunal  should
ask the ‘equally straightforward’ question: ‘Did the defendant treat the  employee  less  favourably
because of his knowledge  of  a  protected  act?’  Thus  where  an  interview  panel  underrated  an
applicant (Mr  Nagarajan)  who  had  previously  brought  discrimination  proceedings,  it  did  not
matter that they did so because they were either consciously, or subconsciously, motivated  by  his
previous action. Of course Sergeant Khan argued that this simple causative test had to be  resolved
in his favour because but for bringing the discrimination claim (the protected act), he  would  have
been given a reference. However, the House of Lords  rejected his argument.
On the issue of causation Lord Nicholls (at para 29) stated that the phrase  by  reason  that,
‘contrary to views sometimes stated’ does not raise a question of causation, which was a  ‘slippery
word’ that could relate to the ‘effective’ cause, or the ‘operative’ cause, or the ‘but  for’  approach.
He declared that:
‘...a causation exercise of this type is not required by either section 1(1)(a)  [which  defines  direct
discrimination] or  section  2.  The  phrases  on  racial  grounds  [from  s  1(1)(a)]  and  by  reason
that denote a different exercise: why did the alleged discriminator act as he did? What consciously
or unconsciously, was his reason? Unlike causation, this is a subjective test’.
Lord Scott held (at para 77): ‘The proceedings [ie Khan’s racial discrimination proceedings]  were
the causa sine qua non. But the language used in section 2 is not the language  of  strict  causation.
The words by reason that suggest...that it is the real reason, the core reason, the causa causans, the
motive, for the treatment complained of that must be identified.’
In apparent contrast to Lord Nicholls, Lord Hoffman (at para 54) said that the issue  was  a
question of causation, but that the causal questions raised by sections 1 and 2 ‘were  not  identical’
(at para 56). He explained this distinction by stating (at para 59):
 ‘...the [less favourable] treatment need not be, consciously or  unconsciously,  a  response   to  the
commencement of proceedings [ie Khan’s racial discrimination proceedings].... It  is  true  that  an
employee who had not commenced proceedings would not have  been  treated  in  the  same  way.
Under  section  1,  one  would  have  needed  to  go  no  further.  Under  section  2,  however,   the
commencement of proceedings must be a reason for the treatment ...’
There is obviously confusion over the precise meaning of the phrase by reason that. Lord Nicholls
says it is not causative, Lord Hoffman said that it was. Lord Hutton’s position  is  unclear  because
he concurred with both Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffman. Meanwhile Lord Scott  said  the  phrase
was one of not strict causation.
 The reasoning becomes more obscure  when  read  alongside  the  majority’s  speeches  in
Nagarajan. Lord Nicholls - the only judge common to both cases - said in Khan (at  para  29)  that
he explained in Nagarajan why the causative approach was not  required.  In  fact,  in  Nagarajan,
Lord Nicholls approved the ‘objective and not subjective’ approach applied to section 1 in EOC  v
Birmingham City Council, and  again  in  James  v  Eastleigh  BC,  where  Lord  Goff  specifically
applied the ‘but for’ test. Lord Nicholls concluded in Nagarajan (at 71)  ‘I  can  see  no  reason  to
apply a different approach  to  section  2’.  In  support  of  his  decision,  Lord  Hoffman  cited  the
following passage from Lord Steyn’s speech in Nagarajan (at 78):
‘[s 2]...contemplates that the  discriminator  had  knowledge  of  the  protected  act  and  that  such
knowledge caused or influenced the discriminator to treat the victimised person less favourably...’
Unfortunately, in this part of his speech, Lord Steyn was  merely  repeating  counsel’s  submission
(on the point that motivation could either conscious or subconscious). Lord Steyn went on to  state
(at 80) - in contrast to Lord Hoffman -  that  the  ‘parallel  provisions  [in  sections  1  and  2]...are
readily capable of parallel meanings’ and so the causative approach - the ‘but for’ test - for section
1, was suitable for section 2.
            The appeal in Nagarajan turned on whether it was enough that the  employer’s  motivation
(in  reacting  to  previous  proceedings)  was  subconscious.  The  House  of  Lords,  applying   the
‘straightforward’   causative   test,   held   that   it   was.   Nothing   said    in    Khan    upsets    the
ratio  decidendi  of  Nagarajan,  which   was   that   motivation   could   be   either   conscious   or
subconscious.  The  speeches  in  Khan  at  best  side-stepped,  and  at  worst  ignored,   the   wider
statements in Nagarajan concerning causation. Nevertheless, a unanimous House of Lords clearly
rejected the ‘straightforward’ causative approach. And so, following Khan, that is what the  law  is
not. The ’but-for’ test is not suitable for cases of victimisation. But it is less easy to  say  what  the
law is.
The key to understanding that, so far as it is  possible,  lies  in  the  decision  of  the  whole
House depending upon a fine distinction, between the bringing and existence  of  proceedings.  To
this end Lords Nicholls, Hoffman and Scott drew support from Cornelius v University  College  of
Swansea [1987] IRLR 141. Here, Ms Cornelius brought proceedings against  her  employer  under
the SDA and,  pending  the  outcome,  she  was  refused  a  transfer  and  access  to  the  grievance
procedure. Consequently she brought  a  separate  action  of  victimisation.  The  Court  of  Appeal
reasoned (at 145-146) that:
‘The existence of the proceedings plainly did influence [the employer’s] decisions. No doubt,  like
most  experienced  administrators,  they  recognised  the  risk  of  acting  in  a  way  which   might
embarrass  the  handling  or  be  inconsistent  with  the  outcome  of   current   proceedings.   They
accordingly wished to defer action until the proceedings were over. But that had ...  nothing  to  do
with the appellant’s conduct in bringing proceedings under the Act.’
Lords Nicholls, Hoffman and Scott noted that the feature  of  this  passage  was  that  College  had
acted on the existence of the proceedings, not the bringing of them. Lord Mackay did  not  rely  on
Cornelius, but relied on the same distinction when holding (at 45):
‘It is clear that if the proceedings had been terminated when the request for a reference  was  made
the obstacle to giving it would have been removed and I have no doubt that  the  chief  officer  has
clearly established that...he did not refuse a reference  by  reason  that  Sergeant  Khan  had  raised
proceedings against him under the Act.’
By focussing on what would happen when the proceedings had  finished,  Lord  Mackay  revealed
that he too distinguished between the existence of the proceedings and the event of Sergeant Khan
bringing them.
The fine distinction between the bringing and existing of proceedings shows  a  drift  away
from the ‘straightforward’ approach adopted by the House  of  Lords  in  Nagarajan,  where  Lord
Nicholls himself said (at 71): ‘... in the application of this legislation legalistic phrases, as  well  as
subtle distinctions, are better avoided so far as possible.’ Khan may have defeated  this  distinction
by adding a second protected act to his claim: under section 2(1)(c), RRA, he had ‘otherwise done
anything under or by  reference  to  this  Act.’  As  well  as  having  brought  proceedings,  he  was
‘otherwise’ maintaining them in existence.
Thus far it could be ventured that the  ratio  decidendi  of  Khan  is  that  a  defendant  who
acted by reason of the existence, and not the bringing, of the proceedings can not  be  liable  under
section 2(1)(a), RRA (by reason that the person has ‘brought proceedings...’). Standing alone, this
proposition sabotages the  purpose  of  the  House’s  own  rejection  of  the  Kirby  comparator  for
proving less  favourable  treatment.  Employers  could  simply  argue  that  they  responded  to  all
proceedings in this way, whatever their nature. So long as the employer  acted  when  proceedings
were pending, virtually no claim of victimisation could succeed under section 2(1)(a).
However, Lord Nicholls added  a  further  dimension  when  concluding  (at  para  31)  that
‘Employers, acting reasonably  and  honestly,  ought  to  be  able  to  take  steps  to  preserve  their
position in pending proceedings without laying  themselves  open  to  a  charge  of  victimisation.’
Similar sentiments were expressed in the other speeches. Lord Mackay noted (at para 44)  that  the
Chief Constable ‘acted in accordance with perfectly understandable  advice.’  Lord  Scott  said  (at
para 80) that this approach still allowed for the case where the employer ‘singled out’ a worker for
less favourable treatment but allowed ‘justice to be done to an employer who...would otherwise be
placed...in an unacceptable Morton’s fork’. And  Lord  Hoffman  observed  (at  para  59)  that  the
Chief Constable’s act may have been ‘a reasonable response to the need to protect the  employer’s
interests as a party to litigation.’
It is now possible to qualify  the  ratio  as  being  that  there  is  no  liability  under  section
2(1)(a), RRA, where the defendant acted, reasonably and honestly, by reason of the existence, and
not the bringing, of proceedings. The qualification appears to safeguard  the  decision  from  abuse
by employers who  may  otherwise  use  it,  for  example,  to  ‘single  out’  workers.  However  the
qualification carries a series of problems.
First and most obviously, there is no such requirement in the  legislation  that  for  liability,
the defendant does not act reasonably and honestly. Second, focussing on the  predicament  of  the
‘reasonable and honest’ employer undermines the policy of the provisions, which  is  the  removal
of deterrents to enforcing the anti-discrimination legislation. The Law Lords’ speeches are littered
with statements sympathetic to the employers’ dilemma. Nowhere did a  judge  express  sympathy
for the worker who  - as well as having acted just as ‘reasonably and honestly’ as their employer  -
will have his or her career frozen for the duration (conceivably several years) of  the  proceedings,
simply because they used anti-discrimination legislation. This  decision  places  the  worker  in  an
unacceptable ‘Khan’s fork’, suffering either discrimination or a frozen career.
Whilst both the employer and the worker will find themselves  in  a  difficult  position,  the
provisions on victimisation are  not  aimed  at  resolving  the  employer’s  predicament.  Empirical
research shows that victimisation is a serious problem in the workplace. (See  for  instance  (1990)
30 EOR 23 where a study  of  103  unsuccessful  claimants  revealed  that  over  a  half  suffered  a
detriment of some sort following the action.) Accordingly Lord Steyn  pronounced  in  Nagarajan
(at  79)  that  victimisation  was  as   serious   a   mischief   as   discrimination   itself.   It   is   now
inconceivable, one hopes, that a tribunal would embark  on  such  a  diversion  from  the  statutory
wording and purpose in a case of discrimination under section 1, no matter  how  ‘reasonably  and
honestly’ the defendant had acted.
Third, this ’extra element’ of acting reasonably and honestly  actually  does  little  to   save
the decision from sabotaging the purpose of rejecting Kirby. It  will  be  recalled  (see  above)  that
Lord Scott rejected Kirby because (at para 72) ‘It would enable employers to victimise  employees
who brought race discrimination proceedings ...provided ....the employers were prepared similarly
to victimise any employee who had the temerity to sue them for anything.’ In most  cases  though,
employers will prove that they  acted  ‘reasonably  and  honestly’  by  showing  that  the  company
normally treats in the same way, any worker who brings  any  proceedings.  Indeed,  that  was  the
defence in Khan.  And  so  the  qualification  does  little  to  prevent  this  decision  subverting  the
rejection of Kirby. Accordingly, employers can escape liability (once  again)  when,  for  example,
suspending  a  worker  on  full  pay,  or  refusing  a  transfer,  promotion,  access  to   a   grievance
procedure, or the usual - but discretionary - incremental pay rise or bonus. So long as  all  workers
are equally ‘victimised’ pending the outcome of proceedings, a claim of victimisation will fail and
Lord Scott’s words on the Kirby comparator count for little.
The fourth problem with the sentiments expressed is that  they  carry  an  indication  that  a
tribunal should look for an intent to victimise - or simple vengeance - on the part of the  employer.
Under the provisions, an employer who acted reasonably and honestly, on ‘understandable advice’
and did not ‘single out’ a worker for treatment, can be liable for victimisation. For instance, where
several months into discrimination proceedings the employer announces, ‘I’ve had enough of  this
trial, it’s gone on far too long. All the  claimant’s  transfer  requests  are  to  be  refused.’  Such  an
employer  would  rely  on  Khan  stating  that  he  reacted  to  the  existence,  not  the  bringing,  of
proceedings.  If  a  tribunal  then  demands  honest  and  reasonable  behaviour  it  must   find   the
employer liable. Yet the only difference  between  this  example  and  Khan  is  vengeance,  which
should not be an ingredient for liability.
Lord Nicholls’ speech appeared to go further than that by including a racial  motive.  After
approving Cornelius, he identified a ‘second  strand’  to  the  case,  noting  that  (at  para  30)  ’the
College’s behaviour had nothing to do  with  the  bringing  of  proceedings  under  the  1975  [Sex
Discrimination]  Act.  The  decisions  would  have  been  the  same,  whatever  the  nature   of   the
proceedings, if the subject matter had been allied to the content of the employee’s requests.’ (Lord
Nicholls’ emphasis.) In other words,  to  be  liable,  the  employer’s  reason  for  acting  has  to  be
related to  the  discrimination  legislation  aspect  of  the  protected  act.  This  approach  is  wrong
because it is actually identifying race, or sex, discrimination, and not victimisation. If,  to  prove  a
case of victimisation  a  claimant  has  to  prove  racial  discrimination,  then  section  2  would  be
redundant.  This  is  confirmed  by   section   3(1),   (an   interpretation   section)   which   confines
racial discrimination to section 1. (The litigant in person in Cornelius argued a similar  line,  cited
at 144.) The danger of this judgement is  that  it  may  cause  tribunals  only  to  find  victimisation
where there is an intention to victimise, or worse, an intention to discriminate  on  racial,  or  other
proscribed, grounds.
            None of this is to say that intention, or motivation, per se should not be a factor.  After  all,
the employer is part of the causal chain, or link between the protected act and  the  less  favourable
treatment. What goes through the employer must, presumably, go through his mind.  But  the  real
issue is, motivated by what? In Aziz  (where  the  claimant  was  expelled  for  making  secret  tape
recordings as evidence for claim of racial discrimination)  it  was  held  that  the  defendants  were
motivated by the breach of trust, even though the tape recordings were part of the protected act. In
Cornelius and Khan the employer was motivated by the existence of the proceedings. These  cases
did not turn on an employer’s clean conscience or benign motive, but the dividing (in Aziz), or  the
distinguishing (in Cornelius and Khan), of the protected act.
Thus, an element of  motivation  per  se  need  not  curtail  the  simple  causative  approach
expressed in Nagarajan and James. So long as the cause of  the  less  favourable  treatment  is  the
protected act, taken without division or fine distinctions, motivation is a harmless ingredient.  This
does not impose a ‘strict liability’ upon defendants, where all that  would  be  required  is  the  less
favourable  treatment  and  the  protected  act.  There  remains  a  link  between  the  two.  So,   for
example, an employer, who knows that a worker has brought a  complaint  of  sexual  harassment,
sacks that worker for an entirely separate incident of theft, would not liable for victimisation.
With  respect,  in  making  a  fine  distinction  between   the   existence   and   bringing   of
proceedings and focussing on the ‘honest and reasonable’ employer’s predicament,  the  House  of
Lords in Khan have strayed from the wording and  the  purpose  of  the  legislation.  This  being  a
House of Lords decision means that now the only remedy for claimants in Khan’s position  lies  in
Parliament, or more realistically, European Community law.
D. European Community Law 
The Equal Treatment Directive (76/207), which covers  sex  discrimination,  does  not,  except  for
one specified  instance  (dismissal  as  a  reaction  to  bringing  a  claim,  art  7),  expressly  outlaw
victimisation. However, cases falling outside art 7 may succeed under the general ambition  of  art
6, which provides that member states  should  ‘introduce  into  their  national  legal  systems  such
measures as are necessary to enable all persons who consider  themselves  wronged  by  failure  to
apply to them the principle of equal treatment...to pursue their claims  by  judicial  process  ....’  In
Coote v Granada (C-185/97) [1998] ALL ER (EC) 865, the  European  Court  of  Justice  held  (at
para 24) that art 6 outlawed measures  taken  by  an  employer  as  a  reaction  to  proceedings  for
discrimination under the Directive.
This formula  was  codified  in  the  Race  Discrimination  Directive  (2000/43).  Article  9
demands that domestic law must ‘protect persons from any adverse treatment  or  ...   consequence
as a reaction to a complaint or to legal proceedings ....’.
Whether or not this could help a claimant in Khan’s position depends on the  ECJ’s  interpretation
of the phrase ’as a reaction to’. To this end, some guidance can be drawn from the ECJ  judgement
in Coote.
Mrs Coote sued her employer following her dismissal  for  being  pregnant.  Subsequently,
and after those proceedings were dead, the  employer  refused  to  give  her  a  reference  and  Mrs
Coote sued again, this time for victimisation.  An  industrial  tribunal  ruled  that  section  6,  SDA
extended discrimination only so far  as  persons  employed  by  the  defendant.  As  Mrs  Coote  no
longer worked for Granada when they refused the reference,  she  was  not  protected  by  the  Act.
The ECJ, under the Equal Treatment Directive, took a different  view,  holding  that  (at  para  24):
‘Fear  of  such  measures  ...  might  deter  workers  who  considered  themselves  the   victims   of
discrimination from pursuing their claims ... and  would  consequently  ...  seriously  ...  jeopardise
implementation of the aim pursued by the Directive.’  By alluding to the  ‘aim’  of  the  legislation
the ECJ are more concerned with its purpose than  technicalities.  By  contrast,  the  British  courts
have doggedly refused to follow Coote in any matter bar that  strictly  covered  by  the  judgement
(ie post-employment victimisation of  those  bringing  proceedings  for  sex  discrimination).  (See
Rhys-Harper v Relaxation Group [2001]  IRLR  460  (sex  discrimination  post-employment)  and
D’Souza v Lambeth LB [2001] EWCA Civ 794 (victimisation post-employment under the RRA).
Of course, these cases are not  directly  relevant  to  Khan’s.  He  was  refused  a  reference
whilst still employed and whilst proceedings were pending. But they do illustrate the difference in
approach. The British courts are concerned with the precise wording of legislation (and of the ECJ
judgement in Coote) whilst the ECJ concentrated on the purpose  of  the  legislation.  It  identified
the purpose of the Equal Treatment Directive  as  achieving  the  principle  of  equal  treatment  by
judicial process. To this end, the ECJ reasoned, workers should not fear measures that would deter
them  from  using  the  legislation.  Following  Khan  any  worker  using   the   anti-discrimination
legislation can have his or her career frozen, possibly for years,  pending  proceedings,  something
that undermines the purpose of the legislation. It would seem that a  case  materially  the  same  as
Khan, where the existing proceedings were for sex discrimination, could succeed in the ECJ.  This
is, of course, no comfort for Sergeant Khan, whose case is  not  covered  by  the  Equal  Treatment
Directive.
4. CONCLUSION
At present the law on victimisation appears to be thus. For establishing  less  favourable  treatment
the claimant must be compared with a person who has not done the protected act, even in a  partial
sense. It is not enough that the claimant was treated differently from that person, but it is sufficient
if the claimant perceived, reasonably, that  the  treatment  was  less  favourable.  However,  on  the
‘causative’ element, an  employer  may  argue  that  he  reacted,  reasonably  and  honestly,  to  the
existence - not the bringing - of proceedings in order to protect  his  position.  And  so  a  claimant
may be  treated  less  favourably  for  the  duration  of  the  proceedings.  This  places  a  victim  of
discrimination in a ’Khan’s Fork’. It may be that the employer’s argument will be  defeated  if  the
claim includes a section 2(1)(c) protected act, which should  cover  the  existence  of  proceedings.
An employer may also argue that he reacted to a particular part of the protected act, eg a breach of
confidence (Aziz). It is probable that the  ECJ  would  take  a  different,  purposive,  approach  and
protect the worker in such cases, irrespective of the technicalities. But  at  present,  EC  legislation
only protects sex discrimination. It will extend to race by June  2003  and  religion  or  belief,  and
sexual orientation by December 2003. The  UK  Government  has  negotiated  extensions  for  age
(2006) and disability (2004) discrimination.
